French official reports had gone as far as to recommend making a rule out of this exception by extending it to all leagues under UEFA"s jurisdiction (Collin, 2004; Denis, 2003) . Another report more modestly questions the pre-conditions for French football clubs to become both more competitive on the pitch, and economically sound (Besson, 2008) . The claimed advantages of the French model may have been influential in informing the thinking underlying the UEFA financial fair play rules
The French model, however, is not universally admired throughout Europe, especially in the countries with the most powerful football leagues. There are at least three criticisms. First, it is argued that relatively weak sporting performance at the European level is the price paid for sound financial management. An extreme variant of this argument, often voiced abroad, is that the French football authorities focus on sound finance to the detriment of sporting performance. Second, smaller deficits and debts may be more an index of the French clubs" lack of competitiveness than an example of exemplary management. Third, in some countries (for example, the UK, Ireland, and the Czech Republic), the French football league and economy are considered to be too heavily regulated, to the detriment of both competitiveness and the level of sporting performance.
Rather than dismiss out-of-hand such views as belonging to the realm of caricature, this chapter considers whether they contain any grain of truth, and searches for a balanced response. Section 1 begins with an assessment of French football sporting and financial performance. Section 2 examines the inputs mobilised for attaining such performance, in order to evaluate in Section 3 the efficiency of professional football clubs in France. Against the background of a typically optimistic financial self-assessment on the part of French football clubs, Section 4 examines the sources and structure of professional football finance, as well as the role of the league"s auditing body. Section 5 presents a more personal analysis, stressing the football clubs" soft budget constraint and a vicious circle between the increasing commercial value of TV broadcasting rights, and skyrocketing club payrolls. Section 6 concludes by drawing some brief conclusions about the future of French professional football.
A trade-off between financial and sporting performance?
Sporting outcomes contrast sharply with financial achievements in French football: in a nutshell, the level of sporting achievement is lower in FL1 than in the other major European football leagues, while financial performance is better on average. A convenient yardstick for evaluating sporting performance is available in the form of achievement records in European and international football. A more subjective assessment can be made by evaluating the sporting quality of domestic games supplied by Ligue 1.
The performance of French clubs in UEFA club competition is not impressive. was the most balanced European major league over the period 1996 to 2012 on average (Table 2A) Insert Table 2 (Table 2B ). According to the standard theory of team sports leagues, FL1 offers the most balanced competition among the major European football leagues, with the lowest rank correlation on average. However, this conclusion is somewhat paradoxical for the French league 1 because, if competitive balance were attractive to spectators, FL1 should have attracted more fans into the stadiums than any of the other major European leagues.
Insert Figure 1 about here in EPL (€49), ILF (€39), GBL (€ 28) and SLC (€ 21). One explanation, which has been cited increasingly in the empirical literature, is that football fans attend games in the hope of seeing their favourite team win, rather than in the hope of witnessing a closely balanced contest (Buraimo and Simmons, 2008) . In France, it has been suggested that football fandom is only loosely linked to regular stadium attendance.
As suggested above, the presumed advantages of a high level of competitive balance in domestic competition are not reflected in performance or achievement in European or international competition. In general clubs from countries with the least balanced domestic competition, or with the most heavily concentrated distribution of revenue (especially TV revenue), exhibit the best Champions League performances and UEFA rankings (Andreff and Bourg, 2006) . Sloane (2006, page 214) confirmed that: "the more successful clubs in small countries may need to be "too strong" for domestic competitions to have any hope of being successful in European wide competitions". In respect of FL1, "weak" could be substituted 1 The relationship between high outcome uncertainty and high income seems to work for the German league.
2 More on empirical limitations of the standard relationship between competitive balance and game attendance in an open team sports league can be found in Andreff (2009 Andreff ( & 2012 League dummies showed that for a GBL or ILC team to reach the same ranking, it must score significantly more goals than a FL1 team; the difference between EPL and FL was not significant. Regressing average game attendance on goal scoring reveals that the average number of goals scored has a positive impact on attendance, while the percentage of 0-0 draws has a strong negative effect.
The importance of goal scoring in attracting spectators is confirmed (Table 3) by regressions of average fan attendance per game in the five European major leagues on the average number of scored goals per game, using data from 1997 to 2010. The relevant coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. After introducing country dummies, however, the association between these two variables vanishes, while the dummies become significant at the 0.01 level.
This suggests that association between fan attendance and goals scored is country-specific, and therefore captured by the dummies. This explanation seems relevant for France, where the patterns of football fandom are rather specific, and probably linked to the demographics of relatively small urban areas (see below).
Insert Table 3 about here
Overall, an excessively balanced domestic competition, together with weak European performances achieved by domestic clubs, and too few goals scored, are factors that may be relevant in explaining the relatively low levels of spectator interest in FL1.
A final sporting outcome, sometimes overlooked, refers to the popularity of football not only as a spectator sport, but also as a participation sport. The impact of the professional sport and national team performance on participation has not been studied widely in the sports economics literature, an exception being Dawson and Downward (2011 EPL turnover is more than twice as large, BL and LF about 40% larger, and LC 20% larger. London, is one of only two European urban areas with more than 8 million inhabitants.
Among the 44 European urban areas with more than 1 million inhabitants, only three others are located in France (Lyon, Marseille, and Lille). Bourg and Gouguet (2010) refer to a "French territorial exception", and there are 36,000 different administrative municipalities within the country. The local fan base is often geared towards very small geographical locations. In this context it is difficult for clubs to attract a large fan base in cities that are mostly relatively small. In many cases attendance is further constrained by stadium capacity.
Insert Table 5 about here LFP assesses itself as the best managed European league, but FL1 has exhibited an overall pre-tax deficit every year since 2000, except for four years (Table 5) . Although the magnitude of FL1 deficits is small compared to IFL and SLC, the record is not exemplary. League debt has grown from €427 million in 2000 to €690 million in 2008; since then it has remained steady at approximately €600 million (Table 6 ). With a €610 million debt in 2010, FL1 was less indebted than Chelsea alone (€638 million) and much less than the whole of the EPL (€2,178 million). For FL1 the greatest concern is the debt structure: payment arrears (on transfer fees, tax and social contributions) representing between 85% (in 2000) and 91% (2008) (second division) financial data are a lesser cause for concern in this respect. Payment arrears, however, are not indices of good management practices (Andreff, 2007a) .
Insert Table 6 about here
Let us now turn to the input side of the French football league and clubs.
Accounting for stadiums, wage inflation, player transfers and training.
In French Insert Table 7 about here
The largest share of football clubs" costs is devoted to paying players" salaries and associated social contributions, in France as in other European countries. The FL1 payroll increased from €324 million in 2000 to €777 million in 2011; it has more than doubled within twelve years (+140% increase). Wage inflation is greater than the increase in league turnover. With more than two-thirds of revenues geared towards payroll payments, FL1, along with ILC and SLF, is seriously troubled by wage inflation (Table 7) . In 2010 the ratio of payroll costs to total revenues was 73%, and in 2011 this ratio increased to 75%.
In the sports economics literature on football, a significant correlation has been found between English clubs" payroll costs and their standing in the championship (Szymanski and Smith, 1997; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; Hall, Szymanski and Zimbalist, 2002) .
Moreover, using Granger causality tests, wages are a significant determinant of a club"s standing, in line with the theory of efficiency wages. In the same vein, Dobson and Goddard (1998) tested causality from lagged gate receipts to current club"s performance. In the case of FL1 and Ligue 2, Llorca and Teste (2012) find reverse Granger causality from sporting performance to payroll costs and gate receipts. They conclude that the model of efficiency wage is not relevant to the specific conditions of French football. Their interpretation is that after a period of success a French football club generates increased revenues, which are immediately used to inflate the payroll in order to retain good players and attract new talent.
FL1 is typically a net exporter of footballing talent: the sales of highly-talented players educated and trained by French clubs are larger in monetary value than expenditure on foreign players imported into the league (Table 5) . French clubs transfer abroad players valued more highly than those they buy from abroad; in other words, FL1 trades its better players for less talented players. To some extent, FL1 plays the role of a nursery league for new talent.
However, from 2001 to 2003, described as "years of folly" (Bolotny, 2006) labour market since the Bosman case has created a disincentive for rich clubs to invest in educating and training their own young players, because they can find players of the same or higher quality at lower cost in minor nursery leagues, or among clubs specialised in "producing" good players (Ericson, 2000) . The experience of 2010 shows that even a league with a solid vocational training system, such as FL1, can be affected by this trend from time to time.
The effect of the Bosman case on the transfer market for French players is exacerbated by the present state of the players' agent profession. In France, this profession is governed by a code, which forbids agent remuneration higher than 10% of the transaction and prohibits members of certain professions, such as sports club manager, from becoming agents.
However, a number of non-registered agents circumvent these rules, and operate in a rigged market where bungs and embezzlements are common practice according to various official reports. 5 Conflicts of interest among agents, club managers and players fuel such malpractice (Brocard, 2010) . which is difficult to enforce in a still non-transparent business.
A non-negligible input to football clubs" activity is provided by managers, trainers and coaches. In European football in particular, when a club"s sporting performance is disappointing to the fans, the manager or coach is often sacked before the end of season, either to create a psychological shock for the team or change the playing tactics, or in the hope of hiring a higher-quality replacement. It has been demonstrated that firing the coach before the end of season is counter-productive using English (Dobson and Goddard, 2001) and Belgian data (De Dios and Forrest, 2007) . Similar results have been reported for French football (Llorca and Teste, 2010) . On average, sporting outcomes improve after a change of coach, but econometric testing does not clearly confirm that the improvement can be attributed to the new coach. French clubs that fired their coaches during the course of the football season obtained poorer results on average than similar (poorly ranked, in bad shape)
clubs that retained their coaches.
Are French professional football clubs efficient?
The Regarding the results, pure technical efficiency scores provide information about high/low managerial efficiency, while scale efficiency scores show whether the club size is optimal or not.
A high average score implies that FL1 is efficient: more than one-third of clubs are on the best practice frontier with an average score of 0.85 (the maximum is 1) for pure technical and scale efficiency. Scale inefficiency is the main source of inefficiency in FL1. On average the clubs" performance is stable over time, but some decline in efficiency is observed, primarily due to the deterioration of the environment that the author interprets as the effect of wage inflation in FL1; the latter has exceeded growth in turnover, as noted above. In most cases, French clubs are oversized in terms of inputs, since they overinvest in player talents at the start of each football season. Therefore, the efficiency of club management may be questioned, and lax management seems to reflect weak club governance.
A more recent paper addresses issues of technical and scale efficiency, again using the DEA and efficiency are not correlated; neither are game attendance and efficiency. The authors again raise the issue of lax management.
The sources of French football finance: from TV-dependence to sugar daddies
Three pillars are alleged to be specific to French professional football: its aforementioned system of player vocational training, a strong ethos of solidarity within the league, and its financial control and auditing (Gouguet and Primault, 2006) . Another pillar is common to all European football: a financial model that is increasingly reliant on TV revenue.
Solidarity is no longer based on sharing gate receipts between the hosts and visiting clubs, which was phased out in the early 1980s. Since then a revenue redistribution scheme relies on the collective sale of TV broadcasting rights by the league, which collects the TV revenues through contracts signed with the TV companies at four-year intervals. Originally, the redistribution scheme was egalitarian, with equal shares of TV revenues being allocated to each FL1 club. Since 2000, the criteria for revenue distribution have become increasingly complex and non-egalitarian. One portion is fixed and equal for all clubs. A second portion depends upon the clubs" rankings at the end of each season. A third portion is indexed to the club"s performance over the past five seasons. A final portion is calculated according to the club"s attractiveness, measured by its TV audience -this criterion was introduced in response to pressure from the clubs with the most TV exposure. Table 8 shows that the league champions in 2010 received three times more TV revenue than one of the lowest-ranked nonrelegated clubs (Sochaux) and roughly four times more than the three relegated clubs. Ligue 2 clubs also receive a (small) share of the TV revenue windfall, although their games were not broadcast at all until recently. Legislation passed in 2000 requires the redistribution of a 5% tax on professional football TV revenues to non-professional sports, through the National
Council for Sport Development (CNDS: Conseil National de Développement du Sport).
The main debate surrounding the distribution of TV revenues is no longer the question of league competitive balance. The distribution depends on pressure and the relative bargaining power of a small number of rich clubs that are the subject of most of the TV coverage, and the majority of smaller clubs. For the formula for the distribution of the TV revenue reflects a minimal commitment to the principle of solidarity between all professional football clubs on the one hand and, on the other hand, is enforced by law to maintain solidarity between professional football and other less endowed sports that do not benefit from similar TV exposure. Since 2000, however, the solidarity principle has been counteracted by the TV windfall obtained from the UEFA Champions League, which is concentrated on the few clubs qualified to enter this competition. However, this driver towards increasing revenue inequality across the clubs is milder in FL1 than in other major European leagues, because of the French clubs" relatively poor performance in the Champions League.
As early as 1974 the supervision of professional football clubs" management has been entrusted to a body which became the DNCG in 1990. Since then, DNCG acted as a real auditing body, capable of implementing disciplinary sanctions against poorly managed clubs.
Every season, the DNCG inspects the financial accounts of all clubs, and since 2002 some of the data have been published, even though initially some clubs in debt attempted to circumvent the requirement to publish their financial data (Andreff, 2007b) . The DNCG"s main official tasks are to audit clubs" financial accounts, supervise their bookkeeping, detect instances of misreporting, and assess the clubs" financial situation.
When a club is continually in the red, the DNCG can use carrot-and-stick tactics to encourage changes of management practice, so that the club"s accounts return to the black. To a foreign observer, it may seem strange that on the one hand French football has a strong auditing body, while on the other hand FL1 repeatedly reports financial deficits. This paradox can be explained by a soft budget constraint (5 infra) linked to weak club governance.
Questions have also been raised as to whether DNCG is an independent auditor. All of its members are appointed from football backgrounds such as FFF, LFP and players", coaches"
and managers" trade unions. A useful reform would be the appointment of at least 50% of the experts who sit on the DNCG from non-football backgrounds. (Table 9) that its financial structure has been described as TV-dependent or even "TV-addicted". The share of TV revenue in total revenue reached 58% in 2011 and 2012, almost as high as in
Italian Calcio (over 60% since 2006).
Insert Table 9 about here
With regard to merchandising and stadium naming rights, French clubs derive a smaller share of their revenue from these sources than some European clubs, such as Manchester United (merchandising) or Arsenal (naming rights). Le Mans signed a naming rights contract with an insurance company some years ago, but it was later relegated to the second division.
The markets that are used for club financing are the labour market for talents by football nursery clubs (2 supra), and capital markets in the form of initial public offerings ( 
Soft budget constraint, TV rights revenues and the financial crisis
Since European football is now essentially deregulated, and in general football clubs do not aim for profit-maximisation, an increasing number of professional clubs run heavy deficits, season after season, and have sunk into deep indebtedness. However, bankruptcy is a rare event, since many clubs have been bailed out, by the banks in Spain (Ascari and Gagnepain, 2006) , occasionally by the state (in Italy, the salve calcio state plan in 2002, Baroncelli and Lago, 2006) , or increasingly by sugar daddy investors. TV companies have regularly helped cover ex post the leagues" deficits by increasing the sums paid for TV rights (Andreff, 2009 ).
In general clubs in the red throughout Europe have not been liquidated, despite heavy arrears on debt repayments, social contributions and tax. Football clubs have spent seemingly without constraint, purchased more inputs than they could afford given their revenues, and have attempted endlessly to recruit expensive superstar players. In this context, economic theory suggests that the firms (clubs) are subject to a soft budget constraint. This situation is typical of a shortage (Kornaï, 1980) or repressed inflation (Benassy, 1982) economy, similar to the former centrally-planned economies, which can also emerge in particular industries in market economies (Kornaï et al., 2003) . A case in point is a sports league with clubs that do not maximise profit. Storm and Nielsen (2012) cite evidence supporting the existence of a soft budget constraint in professional football, and stress that European professional football clubs continually operate on the brink of insolvency without going out of business. The survival rate is high, 7 even though the football business perpetually generates losses. Tables 5 and 6 have documented that French football is no exception in this respect. Since the very existence of payment arrears is a well-known index of poor corporate governance, one interpretation of such a situation is in terms of weak club and league governance (Andreff, 2007a, b; Andreff, 2012) . It suggests that a disequilibrium model may be more useful in describing an open sports league (Andreff, 2014) than the usual equilibrium model elaborated on by Késenne (2007) .
In respect of FL1, like most European football leagues, there is a close association between the rise in TV revenue and payroll inflation. An optimistic interpretation suggests a virtuous circle: TV revenues enable teams to pay high salaries in order to field highly performing squads, whose frequent wins accrue increased TV revenues (Baroncelli and Lago, 2006) .
Italian Calcio, which is the authors" reference, is in the deepest financial crisis and seems difficult to reconcile with the notion of a virtuous circle. Under a vicious circle interpretation, the league, as a monopoly supplier in its own market, bargains for the highest possible TV rights in order to raise ex post the finance that will cover rampant payroll inflation and the escalating costs of superstar recruitment. If this strategy is successful, it will sustain league finances and to some extent bail out football clubs that are in the red. However, in many football leagues, like FL1, the recruitment strategy financed by TV revenue does not translate into sufficient team improvement to produce success in European competition, as required to achieve substantial gains in revenue. With the clubs unable to recoup their recruitment expenditures, the league has to revert to the broadcasters in an effort to negotiate an even higher price for the TV rights, and so on. NOT represents the media attractiveness of each team, using its ranking by LFP according to audience performance;
DIST is a proxy for the distance that TV channels have to cover in order to reach the stadium of each team. DIST is measured using team transportation costs (available from team budgets), which is a suitable proxy, since it measures the costs incurred for a team to travel to all other stadiums in the league (similar to the costs imposed a TV channel that travels to all stadiums for broadcasting purposes). We test the relationship: POP2005 + b.DIST + c.NOT + d.LEAGUE + e.Year2 + f.Year3 + g.Year4 + h.Year5 + i.Year 6 + zi (1) Equation (1) Insert Tables 10 and 11 144.09 *** Significant at a 1% threshold; ** at a 5% threshold; * at a 10% threshold.
